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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE
OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH.
Respondent,
Plaintiff and
Case No.

vs.
9013

JACK ZEIMER.
'Defendant and
Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACfS
Respondent agrees with appellant's statements of facts.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN THE LANGUAGE USED IN HIS INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY.
POINT II.

THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN GRANTING A NEW TRIAL ONLY AS TO
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THE ISSUE OF WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS
HABITUAL CRIMINAL.

AN

ARGUMENT
POINT

I.

THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN THE LANGUAGE USED IN HIS INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY.
Respondent readily admits that the Trial Judge used words
which are inartistic. However, respondent cannot see how the
jury could have misunderstood its rather simple obligation in this
case or how the words "guilt," "guilty," "convict," "convicted,"
"convicting" and "offense" could have misled them. The jury's
members were not trained lawyers, and while such words have
rather specific significance in the minds of attorneys and judges,
they do not bear the same meanings to the minds of laymen.
It would not seem to the jury at all out of line for the
judge to use the term "offense" in relation to one's having the
status of habitual criminal, nor would it seem at all odd for him
to use the terms "guilt" or "guilty" with reference to such a
status.
Even the term "convict" used as a verb, is not sufficiently
precise in the :mind of a lay person to cause him to regard the
status o!' habitual criminal as being a crime when it is not actually
called a crime in the instructions.
The courts are aware that judges must deliver their instructions in a timely way and cannot fully avoid an occasional
misuse of a word or a phrase. 23 C.J.S., Sec. 1300, page 881.
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states:
"A large discretion is vested in the trial judge as to the
language to be used in expounding principles of law.
The exactness of statement which is required in pleadings is not necessary.''
And on the next page, the text continues:
"An instruction is not erroneous because of verbal or
technical inaccuracies or mistakes which are not misleading to the jury or prejudicial to the rights of the
accused.''
As to the usage of particular words, our Utah Court has
not said a great deal. However, in the case of State v. Cerar, 60
U. 208, 207 P. 597, the court discussed the matter of a judge
using an instruction containingI the word ''can'' where the statute
upon which his instruction was based used the term "must."
The court concluded that while the language of the statute had
not been used, that it reRected the true intent and purpose of
the statute and said:
"Any juror with sufficient intelligence to sit in any case
could not be misled by what the court said.''
Clearly the jury in this case could not have been misled as to the
necessity of determining defendant's status.
Moreover, even i/ the jury thought that being an habitual
criminal was a "crtme" instead of a "status," still the defendant's
rights could not have been prejudiced, since the jury would not
have been less inclined to give a defendant fair consideration
when trying him. for a crime than when making a determination
as to his status.
Instructions aside. defendant was not charged in the inSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

formation with having committed any supposed "crime" of
habitual criminal. While it is true that the usual printed infor·mation form was used, the actual wording typed in the information was "that the said defendant · is a habitual criminal"
Nowhere on page 2 of the information is any reference made to
any supposed "crime" of habitual criminal. R. 14.
Furthermore, the sentence and judgment ordering defendant to serve a term in the Utah State Prison refers to "status
of an habitual criminal.'' R. 73, R. 75.
From a consideration of the language used in the information and in the sentence and judgment, and verdict R. 56. it is
difficult to see how appellant successfully can allege that he was
convicted of a "crime" of habitual criminal, regardless of the
terms used in the instructions.
There can be no doubt that the information, along with
the sentence and judgment, and verdict must prevail over the
instructions in determining whether the habitual criminal proceeding was held to determine the perpetration of a crime or the
existence of a status.
In the Washington case of Williams v. Smith, 171 P.2d
197, the court held that a form of verdict finding defendant
guilty of the "crime of being an habitual criminal" was technically improper, but did not affect any of his substantial rights,
and was sufficient to fix his status as habitual criminal. Reasoning
therefrom it would seem to be immaterial whether or not the
jury thought it was determining a crime or a status.
Assuming, but not admitting, that improper language was
used in the instructions, stili, respondent does not believe that
any such possible error can reasonably he· considered prejudicial
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to the substantive right of the defendant to a fair trial.
Furthermore, respondent is unable to see, considering all
the instructions given at the trial, and regarding them as a whole,
as well as the pleadings in the case, how appellant has suffered
any loss of substantive rights or that the Judge corn,tnitted prejudical error.
After hearing all the instructions read, the jury knew that
its one simple function was to determine whether or not the appellant had co)Inmitted two previous crimes for which he had
been sentenced to prison, (the instant conviction for burglary
having been stipulated to by counsel}, and whether or not, therefore, he had achieved the status of habitual criminal.

It is, of course, necessary that all, of the instructions be
construed as a whole. See State v. Evans, 74 Utah 389, 2'7'9 P.
950.
In its first instruction, R. 59, the Judge used the following
language:
"You are instructed that the defendant, Jack Zeimer, is
.charged by page two of the infonnation filed herein of
being in the status of an habitual criminal. * * *"
It will be observed that the Judge was very careful to use the
phrase "beihg in the status of an habitual criminal." Nowhere
does any part of the instruction use the term "crime.'' This instruction is . of primary importance because it is the one which
actually sets out the allegations of page 2 of the infoiiDation, and
which informs the jury of the issue to be defined.
Instruction No. 8, R. 64, states as foilows:
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·'The term 'habitual criminal' is de tined as follows:
Whoever has been previously twice convicted of felonies sentenced and cOlffimitted to any prison, shall, upon
conviction of a felony committed in this state, other than
murder in the tirst or second degree, be deemed to he
an habitual criminal."
It will be observed that this is the proper legal definition of the
term "habitual criminal," and in it the judge was careful to use
the term "be deemed to be an habitual criminal." The word
"deemed" certainly is more consistent With status than with
crime.
Some consideration should be given to Instruction No. 5,
R. 6 L of which instruction, as a whole, appellant complains.
In paragraph 1 thereof the court uses the term "being an habitual
criminal,'' and in the last paragraph of the instruction, uses the
expression ''status of being an habitual criminal.''
Clearly, the instructions of which appellant complains must
be considered in conjunction with those from which we have
just quoted. That is to say, all instructions are to be considered
together. State v. Evans, supra.
In State v. Siddoway, 61 U. 189, 211 P. 968, the Court's
opinion stated in part as follows:
''Instructions must be considered as a whole and so the
court informed the jury. Taking the instructions together, no good reason occurs to us for believing that
jurors endowed with common sense and average intelligence could misunderstand. misconstrue or misapply

them.''
General rules of law which apply to instructions used in
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criminal cases would seem to apply to instructions given in a
proceeding such as the one at hand. Therefore the respondent
calls to the attention of the Court the case of Bridges v. United
States, 199 F. 2d 811 , wherein the court states:
"Instructions given in a criminal prosecution may not be
taken apart and a phrase here and clause, or even a
sentence or paragraph there, used to find error."
The following cases, among many others, stand for the
proposition that the instructions are to be considered as a whole:
Statev. Hansen (Ida.), 181 P. 2d 192; People v. Marsh (Ill.).
85 N.E. 2d 715; Taylor v. State (Okla.), 208 P. 2nd 185;
State v. Hendricks, 123 Utah 267, 258 P. 2d 452.
The Marsh case states:
·'Accuracy in the use of language in an instruction containing a correct proposition of law would, of course.
he desirable, but it is not always obtainable. For that
reason we announced the rule that it is sufficient if the
series of instructions, considered as a whole, fully and
fairly announce the law applicable to the theories of
the People and of the defendant, respectively. People
v. DeRosa, 378 Ill. 557, 39 N.E. 2d 1; People v.
Hichette, 324 III. 170, 155 N.E. 39."
The holding in the Taylor case is particularly interesting
in that it holds that where it appeared that the instruction complained of ''was most poorly worded,'' but not misleading in light
of all the instructions, it did not constitute reversible error. In
the instant case the main problem also appears only to be a matter of poor wording in the instructions.
Each instruction used was given with the intent and the
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effect of assuring a fair and just tricil of the issues·; Many of them
are regular in__structions unifo:mnly given for the protection of those
accused of crimes. They also are equally applicable ·to those
accused of having attained a status. Not only are they not prejudical instructions, but instead are statements calculated only
to assure free and fair consideration of the defendant's cause.
They were favorable to him rather than unfavorable when considered as a whole.

It should also be pointed out that the defendant's attomev
had the opportunity to ask for any additional instructions which
might clarify the group of instructions as a whole.

POINT II.
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN GRANTING A NEW TRIAL ONLY AS TO
THE ISSUE OF WHETHER VEFENDANT WAS AN
HABITUAL CRIMINAL.
Respondent recognizes and admits that the proper procedure to be followed in determining the status of one alleged
to be an habitual criminal is that set forth in Section 76-1-19,
U.C.A. 1953.
We believe, however, that this statute applies only to the
original instance compris,ing the trial upon the substantive charge
and the accompanying proceeding to determine the defendant's
status, whether as an habitual criminal or not.
Respondent does not believe that the statute has mandatory application in a situation such as the one at hand where, for
one reason or another, the court has found it necessary to order
a new proceeding only as to the single issue of defendant's
habitual criminal status.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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An analogous situation is seen in the case of State u. Lee
Lim, 76 U. 68, 7 P. 2d 825. There a defendant was sentenced
to the state prison on a plea of ·guilty to a charge of murder in
the second degree. He later was released on habeas corpus proceedings because the sentence had been improper, even though
imposed within the statutory period. Defendant thereupon was
rearrested and upon the basis of his prior plea, resentenced, this
time properly, to the state prison.
On his appeal to the Supreme Court, defendant urged
that our statute requiring that sentence be imposed during a
period between two and ten days after the conclusion of the
trial prevented his now being sentenced, since a period of three
and one-half years had passed since the original trial. In disposing of this argument .the court stated that:

''It is apparent that Section 904 1 of our Code has no
application to a case where the trial court in good faith
attempted to follow the law but through mistake entered a void judgment instead of a valid one. Our
Legislature, however, has made provision with respect
to errors and mistakes in the administration of the criminal law in the following language: 'Neither a departure
from the form nor mode prescribed by this Code in respect to any pleading or proceeding, nor any error or
mistake therein, shall render it invalid unless it shall have
actually resulted in a miscarriage of justice.' Comp. Laws
of Utah 1917, Sec. 9365."
·
See present statute: 77-53-2, U.C.A. 1953.
By the same token the Court in the case at bar did, in fact,
follow the requited statutory procedure in the original instance.
The substantive charge appearing on page 1 of the indictment was
tried separately by the same jury from the habitual criminal issue
appearing
on page. 2. of the indictment.
.
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The reasoning in State v. Lee Lim, therefore, would appear
to be applicable in the instant case. Here a bona tide eH'ort was
made to follow the precise terms of our statute, but because of a
mistake made in the habitual criminal aspect of the original triaL
the court deemed it necessary to declare a mistrial as to that issue
only, and as to it to require a second triaL which of necessity had
to be by a separate jury.
Clearly, the Legislature simply did not forsee this exact
situation and for that reason failed to make any provision to
cover the matter at hand.
Appellant refers to two Califomia cases, both entitled

People v. Morton. The later Morton case, 41 Cal. 2d 636, 261
P. 2d 523, was decided in 1953. It would appear to be controlling over the other cases cited in appellant's brief and, in fact,
gives much consideration to each of the procedural steps suggested in appellant's brief.
The case clearly sets out the proper procedure under the
Califomia statute and in so doing affords us some interesting and
helpful reasoning. There a defendant was convicted of three
counts gf tirst degree burglary and one count of attempted burglary in tlrst degree, for which he was sentenced to serve consecutive terms. In the same proceeding he was adjudged an habitual
criminal. His appeal was merely from that part of the judgment
adjudging him an habitual criminal and from an order denyin~
his motion for a new trial on the issue of one of the prior convictions. Therefore, while not identical with the instant case, it is
closely analogous.
There the court used the following language:
"When the sole question on remand from an appellate
court involves the proof of an alleged prior conviction,
there is no reason to require the parties to re-try the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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question of guilt of the primary offenses when the correctness of the determination of this question is not challenged by either party. There is nothing prejudicial
involved in a· limited new trial on the issue of the challenged prior conviction by a jury different from that
which tried the issue of guilt of the primary offenses.
That issue and the proof of prior convictions are clearly
severable. McVickers, supra; In Re Seeley, 29 Cal.
2d 294, 176 P. 2d 24; People v. Carrow, supra. Proof
of prior convictions or the adjudication that the defendant is an habitual criminal do not involve substantive
offenses, but merely provide for increased punishment
of those whose prior convictions fall within the scope
of these statutes. In Re McVickers, supra, 29 Cal. 2d
264, 270-271, 176 P. 2d 40, 44-45, and references
cited there. The ilmportant relation between the primary
offenses and the prior convictions charged is therefore
the sentence to be imposed and the jury does not participate in that.''
Respondent does not dispute appellant's contention that
the California statute ·in force at the time of the above opinion
did not require the trial of the two issues by the same jury. However, appellant reiterates his view that under the Utah statute
the trial of the two issues by the same jury is mandatory only in
the original instance. Therefore, assuming this, the opinion of
the California court should be accorded great weight.
A primary purpose in having the defendant tried on both
phases of the case by a single jury might well be that of determining the question of habitual criminal in a timely manner
in order that the sentence might be imposed within the statutory
period, thus eliminating delays that might come from the impanelling of a new jury and the conducting of a new trial.
In State v. Stewart, 110 Utah 203, 171 P. 2d 383 (after
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setting out the procedure to be followed in trying a defendant
accused of being an habitual criminal--which procedure is substantially the same as that now required by our statute), the
court says at page 387:

"While safeguarding the rights of the accused, such
procedure does not otfend any principle of orderly procedure nor tend to delay justice."
The Court, at another point in its opinion, indicated clearly
that the substantive right sought to be guarded by the statute
was to he relieved of being advertised to the jury as one who had
previously been convicted of the new otfense. Respondent is
not aware how this right can better be provided a defendant
through having the main issue and the question of habitual crimin(!.l tried by the same jury.
As a matter of fact, trial by a separate jury can only benefit
a defendant. Clearly a jury which has sat through a long trial and
has come to believe that defendant has performed the unlawful
acts necessary to constitute the crime alleged in the main issue,
would likely be more inclined to believe that such defendant had
in the past perpetrated other unlawful crimes than. would a fresh
jury with no prior exposure to the defendant and his misconduct.
In fact, a new jury would be free of any possible prejudice against
the defendant and would be completely capable of judging objectively his status as habitual criminal or not.
It would appear to be a totally unnecessary use of time
and ,effort and, in fact. to constitute a burden on the judicial process, to require the retrial of one issue already fully and fairly
deteJmined, and which is not in any way vital to the detennina·
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tion of another, particularly where the two issues are entirely
separated in the information.
Finally, even assuming error on the part of the court, both
in giving the instructions complained of and in allowing the
habitual criminal issue to be tried by a separate jury (after the
proper procedure had been used in the first instance), still, the
supposed error was not serious enough to be classified as prejudical. and therefore the judgment below should not be disturbed.
Our court has spoken on this issue on many occasions and
respondent sets forth the words of the court in the case of State
o/ Utah v. Don /esse Neal, 1 U. 2d 122, 262 P. 2d 756:
"We are also conscious of the fact that a trial in the
courts of this state is a proceeding in the interest of
justice to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused, and not just a game. We will not reverse criminal cases for mere error or irregularity. It is only where
there has been error which is both substantial and prejudicial to the rights of the accused that a reversal is
warranted. The defendant was entitled to a full and
fair presentation of the case to a jury of unbiased citizens
an~. to have his rights safeguarded by competent counsel.
Even considering the fact that the trial of the issue of whether
or not one is an habitual criminal is only to determine a status
and not to determine the perpetration of a crime, respondent
feels the above language is entirely appropriate and relies thereon
for his conclusion that even if error complained of was committed
in the case, it was not prejudicial.
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CONCLUSION
Respondent does not believe that the use of the indicated
language in the court's instructions, when properly considered
in conjunction with other instructions given, was prejudicial in
any way to the substantive rights of appellant.
Nor does the respondent believe that appellants' being
tried by a separate jury a second time only as to the habitual
criminal issue constituted prejudicial error. In fact, respondent
believes that appellant not only was not injured, but instead was
given even more favorable and unbiased consideration than he
would have been given had both the allegations of the substantive·
crime and the habitual criminal issue been finally tried by the
same jury.
In light of the preceding cases and reasoning, respondent
prays the Court for an order affii'ming the decision of the trial
court.
Respectfully submitted
WALTER L. BUDGE
Attorney General
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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